Simultaneous auctions for complementary goods by Shin, Wiroy
Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods
Wiroy Shin
December 9, 2013
Abstract
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auc-
tions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before
making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in
their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions and
two bidders. We show that a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
exists in the environment.
Keywords : simultaneous auctions, multi-object auction, first-price auction, equi-
librium existence, monotone pure-strategies.
1 Introduction
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for
complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids,
and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For
simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions and two bidders. We show
that a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists in the environment.
This model, in which the auction mechanism has an exogenous (albeit widely used)
form and in which sellers do not interact strategically with one another, is intended
to provide a tractable framework for applied research focusing on competition among
buyers. Each buyer is trying to acquire a portfolio of objects that must be purchased by
auction from several unrelated sellers. eBay’s various sealed-bid auctions under same
collectibles category which are run by different sellers with similar closing time can be
an example of this environment. Also, less explicit, but equally compelling, auctions for
acquisition of firms manufacturing a final good and an intermediate good input can be
another example. Here, a buyer intends to create a vertically integrated firm and the
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two acquired firms can be viewed as complements when they are merged.
There are several branches of existing auction research that are similar to, but dis-
tinct from, what is being done here. Let us comment briefly on those contributions, and
on how the present research is distinguished from them. A literature on multi-unit auc-
tions, including Bresky (1999) and McAdams (2003), studies sale of multiple identical
goods in an auction with specific pricing rules. As modeled, multiple identical objects
resemble substitutable distinct objects rather than complementary ones modeled here.
Package auctions(see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002))
model multiple goods without assuming substitutability only. They suppose that an ex-
plicit bid can be offered for a package of objects, which is not possible when various
objects are auctioned by distinct and unrelated sellers.
There are a few prior research contributions on simultaneous auctions, including
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and Bikhchandani (1999). They either assume complete
information on bidders’ valuations or employ a single parameter for private value signals
of multiple objects. However, such parameterization is too rigid to model heterogeneity
of bidders’ preferences on each item and complementarity. In this paper, we relax those
restrictions so that the environment in which each bidder receives private independent
signals for each heterogeneous object is permitted.
We follow Reny (2011) to prove the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equi-
librium. Along with basic assumptions on the Bayesian games(G.1-G.6, p.509 Reny
(2011)), weak single crossing property and weak quasi supermodularity are sufficient for
the existence theorem in his paper.1
The remainder of this paper as follows. In the next section, we present an environ-
ment of simultaneous separate complementary first-price auctions in detail, and proposes
a theorem for the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium. Section 3 provides
the proof, and section 4 discusses an extension of the study to a continuum bid space
setting.
2 Simultaneous first-price auctions for complemen-
tary goods
In this section, we define simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods with
2 non-identical objects and 2 bidders. This specific auction environment is denoted by
M. At the end of the section, we propose a theorem for the existence of monotone
pure-strategy equilibrium.
1Reny (2011), Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.4
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2.1 Environment
Bidder i ∈ {1, 2}.
Object k ∈ {1, 2}, Values of objects2 are represented by vector xi = (xi1, xi2). xik ∼
F (·) and xik ∈ X = [0, 1]. Let F (·) be atomless.
; xik is a random variable with a CDF F (·), which has a support X and a PDF
f : X → [0, 1]. Each object k is distributed i.i.d. Therefore, joint CDF and joint
PDF for two objects (xi1, xi2) are given by G(xi1, xi2) = F (xi1) × F (xi2), and
g(xi1, xi2) = f(xi1)× f(xi2), respectively.
Bid bi = (bi1, bi2) ∈ B × B = A ⊂ R2. Each bidder i places bids bi1 and bi2 simultane-
ously. B is a finite subset of R. That is, we assume that the action space of this
game, A, is finite.
Utility Each bidder has a quasi linear ex-post utility Ui(·, ·, ·, ·).
Ui(bi, bj, xi, xj) =

u(xi1, xi2)− (bi1 + bi2) if bi1 > bj1 and bi2 > bj2 , where i 6= j
u(xi1, 0)− bi1 if bi1 > bj1 and bi2 < bj2
u(0, xi2)− bi2 if bi1 < bj1 and bi2 > bj2
0 otherwise.
(1)
Note that when ties occur the object is allocated randomly to one of two bidders
with 1
2
probablity. The ex-post utility can be interpreted as follows. An agent
realizes his utility from objects he wins, through a function u : R2 → R. u(·, ·)
transforms the independent values of goods to utility which counts a synergy effect
between two objects, e.g. u(xi1, xi2) = xi1 + xi2 +α · 1{xik>0, k∈{1,2}}, where α > 0.
And then, the bidding values for the objects he wins are subtracted from u(·, ·).
Here are additional assumptions on the u(ξ).
(A1) u(xi) is increasing in xi.
(A2) λ(xi1, xi2) = u(xi1, xi2)−[u(xi1, 0)+u(0, xi2)] ≥ 0 , where xi1 ≥ 0 and xi2 ≥ 0
; This assumption implies that regardless of values of objects, agents realize that
utility from winning both objects is greater than or equal to sum of utilities of
each good. (e.g. Goods are complementary, Owning all bike shops in New York
City yields monopolistic positioning benefit in the business)
(A3) Let ≥ be a coordinatewise partial order on types. That is, [xi ≥ yi ⇔ (xi1 ≥
yi1) and (xi2 ≥ yi2)]. Assume [xi ≥ yi ⇒ λ(xi) ≥ λ(yi)]. In other words, λ is
monotone in xi = (xi1, xi2).
2It can be interpreted as a type of an agent.
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In summary , bidders expect an extra synergy by obtaining both items, and the
value of the synergy is weakly increasing with values of obtained goods.
Since it is reasonable not to bid more than the maximum of utility an agent can
earn, we restrict the minimum and maximum bid on one good as u(0, 0) and u(1, 1)
respectively. Let u(1, 1) be denoted by u¯. Without loss of generality, we impose u(0, 0) =
0 and constant increments on bids. Accordingly, the action space is A = {0, 1
n
, 2
n
, ..., u¯}×
{0, 1
n
, 2
n
, ..., u¯}, n ∈ Z+.
2.2 Monotone pure-strategy equilibrium
A pure-strategy for bidder i is a function si : X
2 → A and it is monotone if x′i ≥ xi
implies si(x
′
i) ≥ si(xi), for all x′i, xi ∈ X2. Let Si be a set of monotone pure strategies
of i. Based on the environment in section 2.1, bidder i’s expected utility can be written
as follows.
Let µs−i be a distribution of an opponent’s bids constructed by s−i(x−i) and G(x−i).
Define
P3(bi) = µs−i([0, bi1)× [0, bi2)) +
1
2
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× [0, bi2))
+
1
2
µs−i([0, bi1)× [bi2, bi2]) +
1
4
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× [bi2, bi2]);
P1(bi) = µs−i([0, bi1)× (bi2, u¯]) +
1
2
µs−i([0, bi1)× [bi2, bi2])
+
1
2
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× (bi2, u¯]) +
1
4
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× [bi2, bi2]);
P2(bi) = µs−i((bi1, u¯)× [0, bi2)) +
1
2
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× [0, bi2))
+
1
2
µs−i((bi1, u¯]× [bi2, bi2]) +
1
4
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× [bi2, bi2]).
(2)
P3(bi) denotes a probability that bidder i wins both objects with bi when the oppo-
nent plays s−i. P1(bi) and P2(bi) indicate probabilities for winning object 1 only and
object 2 only, respectively. Then, if an agent with type xi bids bi, the bidder i’s expected
utility is
Vi(bi, xi, s−i) = P3(bi)[u(xi1, xi2)−(bi1+bi2)]+P1(bi)[u(xi1, 0)−bi1]+P2(bi)[u(0, xi2)−bi2].
(3)
To make proofs easy in section 3, we modify a representation of the expected utility.
Define
Q3(bi1, bi2) = P3(bi);
Q1(bi1, bi2) = µs−i([0, bi1)× [0, u¯]) +
1
2
µs−i([bi1, bi1]× [0, u¯]);
Q2(bi1, bi2) = µs−i([0, u¯]× [0, bi2)) +
1
2
µs−i([0, u¯]× [bi2, bi2]).
(4)
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Q1(bi1, bi2) denotes a probability that bidder i with a bid bi1 wins the object 1 at
least. Q2(bi1, bi2) also describes a probablity that bidder i with a bid bi2 wins the object
2 at least. Note that Q1 only depends on bi1 and is increasing in bi1, and Q2 only depends
on bi2 and is increasing in bi2. For notational convenience, we eliminate bi2 and bi1 in
Q1 and Q2’s argument respectively. Q3 is increasing in both bi1 and bi2.
The way that constructing Q1, Q2 and Q3 infers [P3(bi) = Q3(bi), P1(bi1) = Q1(bi1)−
Q3(bi), P2(bi) = Q2(bi2)−Q3(bi)].
Then, (3) becomes
Vi(bi, xi, s−i) = Q1(bi1)[u(xi1, 0)− bi1] +Q2(bi2)[u(0, xi2)− bi2]
+Q3(bi1, bi2)[u(xi1, xi2)− (bi1 + bi2)− (u(xi1, 0)− bi1)− (u(0, xi2)− bi2)]
= Q1(bi1)[u(xi1, 0)− bi1] +Q2(bi2)[u(0, xi2)− bi2]
+Q3(bi1, bi2)[u(xi1, xi2)− u(xi1, 0)− u(0, xi2)]
= Q1(bi1)[u(xi1, 0)− bi1] +Q2(bi2)[u(0, xi2)− bi2] +Q3(bi1, bi2)λ(xi).
(5)
Under the auction M, (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium, if
for every bidder i ∈ {1, 2} and every xi ∈ X2,
Vi(si(xi), xi, s−i) ≥ Vi(bi, xi, s−i) (6)
for all bi ∈ A.
Theorem 1. Suppose an auction satisfies the environment M which is defined in section
2.1. Then, there exist a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium for the auction M.
3 Proof of Theorem 1
Under the auctionM, we have an atomless CDF for object values with a two-dimensional
compact support. Therefore, by propositon 3.1 in Reny (2011), assumptions G.1-G.5 on
the Bayesian game (p.509 Reny (2011)) are satisfied. Also, with a finite action space A
definied in section 3.1, the action space is a lattice, and the ex-post utility Ui is bounded,
jointly measurable and continuous in bi ∈ A for every xi ∈ X2. By the proposition 4.4(i)
in Reny (2011), if the interim utility Vi(bi, xi, s−i) satisfies weak single crossing property
and quasi supermodularity, Theorem 1 is proved.
3.1 Weak single crossing property of Vi(bi, xi, s−i)
Definition 1. Vi(bi, xi, s−i) satisfies weak single crossing if for all monotone pure strate-
gies s−i of the opponent, if for all b′i ≥ bi, and for all x′i ≥ xi,
Vi(b
′
i, xi, s−i) ≥ Vi(bi, xi, s−i) implies Vi(b′i, x′i, s−i) ≥ Vi(bi, x′i, s−i). (7)
5
Let b′i = (b
h
i1, b
h
i2), bi = (b
l
i1, b
l
i2), x
′
i = (x
h
i1, x
h
i2), xi = (x
l
i1, x
l
i2).
Lemma 1. With bi, b
′
i, xi and x
′
i, (7) holds. That is,
Vi(b
h
i1, b
h
i2, xi, s−i)− Vi(bli1, bli2, xi, s−i) ≥ 0 (8)
implies
Vi(b
h
i1, b
h
i2, x
′
i, s−i)− Vi(bli1, bli2, x′i, s−i) ≥ 0. (9)
Proof. (8) gives
Q1(b
h
i1)[u(x
l
i1, 0)− bhi1] +Q2(bhi2)[u(0, xli2)− bhi2]
+Q3(b
h
i1, b
h
i2)[u(x
l
i1, x
l
i2)− u(xli1, 0)− u(0, xli2)]
≥ Q1(bli1)[u(xli1, 0)− bli1] +Q2(bli2)[u(0, xli2)− bli2]
+Q3(b
l
i1, b
l
i2)[u(x
l
i1, x
l
i2)− u(xli1, 0)− u(0, xli2)]
(10)
⇔ [Q3(bhi1, bhi2)−Q3(bli1, bli2)]λ(xi)
≥ [Q1(bli1)[u(xli1, 0)− bli1]−Q1(bhi1)[u(xli1, 0)− bhi1]]
+[Q2(b
l
i2)[u(x
l
i1, 0)− bli2]−Q2(bhi2)[u(xli1, 0)− bhi2]]
(11)
We want to show that (11) gives (9). Rewriting (9),
[Q3(b
h
i1, b
h
i2)−Q3(bli1, bli2)]λ(x′i)
≥ [Q1(bli1)[u(xhi1, 0)− bli1]−Q1(bhi1)[u(xhi1, 0)− bhi1]]
+[Q2(b
l
i2)[u(0, x
h
i2)− bli2]−Q2(bhi2)[u(0, xhi2)− bhi2]]
(12)
To prove lemma, it is sufficient to show that [(LHS(12) ≥ LHS(11)) and (RHS(11) ≥
RHS(12))].
LHS(12)− LHS(11) = [Q3(bhi1, bhi2)−Q3(bli1, bli2)][λ(x′i)− λ(xi)] ≥ 0. (13)
The inequality comes from the fact that both terms are positive. Q3 is increasing in its
argument. Also, λ(xi) is monotone by (A3) in section 2.1, and x
′
i ≥ xi.
RHS(11)−RHS(12) = Q1(bli1)[u(xli1, 0)− u(xhi1, 0)]−Q1(bhi1)[u(xli1, 0)− u(xhi1, 0)]
+Q2(b
l
i2)[u(0, x
l
i2)− u(0, xhi2)]−Q2(bhi2)[u(0, xli2)− u(0, xhi2)]
= [Q1(b
l
i1)−Q1(bhi1)][u(xli1, 0)− u(xhi1, 0)]
+[Q2(b
l
i2)−Q2(bhi2)][u(0, xli2)− u(0, xhi2)]
≥ 0
(14)
The inequality comes from the fact that Q1, Q2 and u is increasing in its argument. 
Therefore, by Lemma 1, Vi(bi, xi, s−i) satisfies weak single crossing property.
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3.2 Weak quasi-supermodularity of Vi(bi, xi, s−i)
Definition 2. Vi(bi, xi, s−i) is weakly quasisupermodular if for all monotone pure strate-
gies s−i of the opponent, if for all bi, b′i ∈ A, and every xi ∈ X2,
Vi(bi, xi, s−i) ≥ Vi(bi ∧ b′i, xi, s−i) implies Vi(bi ∨ b′i, xi, s−i) ≥ Vi(b′i, xi, s−i). (15)
If b′i ≥ bi, where ≥ is a coordinatewise partial order, (15) holds trivially. Therefore,
we focus on the case [(bi1 > b
′
i1) and (bi2 < b
′
i2)]. Let b
h
ik, b
l
ik ∈ B and bhik > blik for any
k ∈ {1, 2}. For the current case, let bi = (bhi1, bli2) and b′i = (bli1, bhi2).
Substitute bi, b
′
i, to (15). That is,
Vi(b
h
i1, b
l
i2, xi, s−i)− Vi(bli1, bli2, xi, s−i) ≥ 0 (16)
implies
Vi(b
h
i1, b
h
i2, xi, s−i)− Vi(bli1, bhi2, xi, s−i) ≥ 0. (17)
(16) gives
Q1(b
h
i1)[u(xi1, 0)− bhi1] +Q2(bli2)[u(0, xi2)− bli2]
+Q3(b
h
i1, b
l
i2)[u(xi1, xi2)− u(xi1, 0)− u(0, xi2)]
≥ Q1(bli1)[u(xi1, 0)− bli1] +Q2(bli2)[u(0, xi2)− bli2]
+Q3(b
l
i1, b
l
i2)[u(xi1, xi2)− u(xi1, 0)− u(0, xi2)]
(18)
⇔ Q1(bhi1)[u(xi1, 0)−bhi1]−Q1(bli1)[u(xi1, 0)−bli1] ≥ [Q3(bli1, bli2)−Q3(bhi1, bli2)]λ(xi). (19)
Rewriting (17),
Q1(b
h
i1)[u(xi1, 0)− bhi1]−Q1(bli1)[u(xi1, 0)− bli1] ≥ [Q3(bli1, bhi2)−Q3(bhi1, bhi2)]λ(xi). (20)
Since LHS of (19) and (20) are identical, a sufficient condition for weak quasisupermod-
ularity is [RHS (19) ≥ RHS (20)].
RHS(19)−RHS(20) = λ(xi) ·
[[Q3(b
h
i1, b
h
i2)−Q3(bhi1, bli2)]− [Q3(bli1, bhi2)−Q3(bli1, bli2)]].
(21)
With the assumption(A2), λ(xi) ≥ 0, for weak quasisupermodularity, it is sufficient to
show that [RHS (19) - RHS (20)] is positive. That is,
[Q3(b
h
i1, b
h
i2)−Q3(bhi1, bli2)]− [Q3(bli1, bhi2)−Q3(bli1, bli2)] ≥ 0. (22)
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Lemma 2. Recall that in the auction M, X2 = [0, 1]2 and A = {0, 1
n
, 2
n
, ..., u¯} ×
{0, 1
n
, 2
n
, ..., u¯}, n ∈ Z+. In this environment, inequality (22) holds for all monotone
pure-strategies of the opponent.
Proof. Let xj ∈ X × X and p(xj) = prob(xj). Also, define an ex-post two objects
winning probability function for i, q(bi, bj) as follows.
q(bi, bj) =

1 if bi > bj
1/2 if [(bi1 > bj1) and (bi2 = bj2)] or [(bi1 = bj1]) and (bi2 > bj2)]
1/4 if bi = bj
0 otherwise.
(23)
Suppose the opponent plays an arbitrary monotone pure-strategy βj(xj) = (βj1(xj), βj2(xj)),
for all xj. Then, given βj, bidder i’s interim probability for winning both objects
Q3(bi, βj) is
Q3(bi, βj) =
∫
xj∈X2
p(xj) · q(bi, βj(xj)) dxj (24)
As a result, the LHS of (22) can be expressed as follows.
[Q3(b
h
i1, b
h
i2, βj)−Q3(bhi1, bli2, βj)]− [Q3(bli1, bhi2, βj)−Q3(bli1, bli2, βj)]
=
∫
xj∈X2
p(xj)[{q(bhi1, bhi2, βj(xj))− q(bhi1, bli2, βj(xj))}
−{q(bli1, bhi2, βj(xj))− q(bli1, bli2, βj(xj))}] dxj
=
∫
xj∈X2
p(xj)[H(b
h
i1, b
l
i2, b
h
i2, βj(xj))−D(bli1, bli2, bhi2, βj(xj))] dxj.
(25)
Note thatH(bhi1, b
l
i2, b
h
i2, βj(xj)) = q(b
h
i1, b
h
i2, βj(xj))−q(bhi1, bli2, βj(xj)) andD(bli1, bli2, bhi2, βj(xj)) =
q(bli1, b
h
i2, βj(xj))− q(bli1, bli2, βj(xj)). That is, H represents an increase in q, expost win-
ning probability for both objects, when the agent i increases the second object’s bid,
while bidding high for the first object. D describes the same effect when i bids low for
the first object.
Now, we want to show ∀xj,∀~bi ∈ {(bli1, bli2, bhi1, bhi2)| bhik > blik, k = 1, 2},
H(bhi1, b
l
i2, b
h
i2, βj(xj))−D(bli1, bli2, bhi2, βj(xj)) ≥ 0.
Pick arbitrary xj and βj, and let’s calculate H(b
h
i1, b
l
i2, b
h
i2, βj(xj))−D(bli1, bli2, bhi2, βj(xj)),
for every possible case between ~bi and βj(xj).
3 We start from the first main category,
which describes the case that the second bid of the opponents is located between bidder
3There are 5 main categories defined by [bhi2, b
l
i2, and βj2(xj)] and 5 sub categories defined by
[bhi1, b
l
i1, and βj1(xj)] . The main categories are [b
h
i2 > βj2(xj) > b
l
i2], [b
h
i2 > βj2(xj) = b
l
i2 ], [b
h
i2 > b
l
i2 >
βj2(xj)], [b
h
i2 = βj2(xj) > b
l
i2] and [βj2(xj) > b
h
i2 > b
l
i2]. Sub categories are shown in Table. 1.
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i’s high and low bids for the second object. In this case, the low bid always gives value
0 for q(·, bli2, βj(xj)).
1. bhi2 > βj2(xj) > b
l
i2
For bli1, there are 3 possibilities.
i) bli1 < βj1(xj)
D11 = q(b
l
i1, b
h
i2, βj(xj))− q(bli1, bli2, βj(xj)) = 0− 0 = 04
ii) bli1 = βj1(xj)
D21 = qj(b
l
i1, b
h
i2, βj(xj))− q(bli1, bli2, βj(xj)) = 1/2− 0 = 1/2
iii) bli1 > βj1(xj)
D31 = q(b
l
i1, b
h
i2, βj(xj))− q(bli1, bli2, βj(xj)) = 1− 0 = 1
For bhi1, there are 3 possibilities.
a) bhi1 < βj1(xj)
H11 = q(b
h
i1, b
h
i2, βj(xj))− q(bhi1, bli2, βj(xj)) = D11 = 0
The second equality holds, since bhi1 plays a same role with b
l
i1 in D
1
1.
b) bhi1 = βj1(xj)
H21 = D
2
1 = 1/2
c) bhi1 > βj1(xj)
H31 = D
3
1 = 1
4The subscript of D(or H) denotes the main category number, and the superscript describes the
cases defined by first bids.
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Table 1: H −D category
H1 H2 H3
bh1 < βj1(xj) b
h
1 = βj1(xj) b
h
1 > βj1(xj)
D1 b
l
1 < βj1(xj) H
1 −D1 H2 −D1 H3 −D1
D2 b
l
1 = βj1(xj)   H3 −D2
D3 b
l
1 > βj1(xj)   H3 −D3
Cells with  are not defined,
because [bl1 > βj1 > b
h
1 ] contradicts to [b
h
1 > b
l
1].
In summary,
H11 = D
1
1 = 0
H21 = D
2
1 = 1/2
H31 = D
3
1 = 1
(26)
See the Table 1. We want to show that values of the cells defined are positive or
zero, and it holds with the results in (26). It also holds for below 4 cases.
2. bhi2 > βj2(xj) = b
l
i2
H12 = D
1
2 = 0− 0 = 0
H22 = D
2
2 = 1/2− 1/4 = 1/4
H32 = D
3
2 = 1− 1/2 = 1/2
(27)
3. bhi2 > b
l
i2 > βj2(xj)
H13 = D
1
3 = 0− 0 = 0
H23 = D
2
3 = 1/2− 1/2 = 0
H33 = D
3
3 = 1− 1 = 0
(28)
4. bhi2 = βj2(xj) > b
l
i2
10
H14 = D
1
4 = 0− 0 = 0
H24 = D
2
4 = 1/4− 0 = 1/4
H34 = D
3
4 = 1/2− 0 = 1/2
(29)
5. βj2(xj) > b
h
i2 > b
l
i2
H15 = D
1
5 = 0
H25 = D
2
5 = 0
H35 = D
3
5 = 0
(30)
We have shown that H(bhi1, b
l
i2, b
h
i2, βj(xj)) − D(bli1, bli2, bhi2, βj(xj)) ≥ 0 holds for every
cases. Therefore, the inequality (22) holds. Note that no restriction exists for p(xj).
Hence, any distribution on X is allowed. 
Therefore, by Lemma 2, the interim utility Vi(bi, xi, s−i) is weakly quasi-supermodular.
4 Conclusion
This paper has shown the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in simulta-
neous first-price auctions, where the objects have synergy in bidders’ utility. Under the
complementarity assumptions, weak single crossing property and weak quasi supermod-
ularity of interim utility are satisfied, so Reny (2011)’s existence theorem is applicable
in this environment.
As a future research, it is meaningful to think about the environment in a continuum
action space setting. As Athey (2001) argues in the paper, it would support a differen-
tial equation approach to verify existence conditions. She provides the extension with
a continuum action space by showing ties do not occur in the game. Reny (2011) also
presents the extension through a better-reply secure game and a limit of a pure-strategy
of  equilibria.
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